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Abstract
Objective: We conducted five studies testing whether an implicit measure of favorability toward power over universalism
values predicts spontaneous prejudice and discrimination.
Method: Studies 1 (N5 192) and 2 (N5 86) examined correlations between spontaneous favorability toward power (vs.
universalism) values, achievement (vs. benevolence) values, and a spontaneous measure of prejudice toward ethnic minorities.
Study 3 (N5 159) tested whether conditioning participants to associate power values with positive adjectives and
universalism values with negative adjectives (or inversely) affects spontaneous prejudice. Study 4 (N5 95) tested whether
decision bias toward female handball players could be predicted by spontaneous attitude toward power (vs. universalism)
values. Study 5 (N5 123) examined correlations between spontaneous attitude toward power (vs. universalism) values,
spontaneous importance toward power (vs. universalism) values, and spontaneous prejudice toward Black African people.
Results: Spontaneous positivity toward power (vs. universalism) values was associated with spontaneous negativity toward
minorities and predicted gender bias in a decision task, whereas the explicit measures did not.
Conclusions: These results indicate that the implicit assessment of evaluative responses attached to human values helps to
model value-attitude-behavior relations.
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Famous people throughout history have shown intense attach-
ment to power while denying that they like power. For example,
although Napoleon ascended from a low status in Corsica to
emperor of France, he felt more attached to high ideals of honor,
liberty, and equality than to power (Cronin, 1971). Centuries
before Napoleon, Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1513/1981) classic
treatise, The Prince, suggested that successful rulers must place
power above virtue, occasionally using brutality and vice as
tools, while not revealing their singular obsession with power to
others. These examples show how either a sincere belief in self-
transcending values (e.g., equality) or a mere desire to seem vir-
tuous may lead power-accruing individuals to claim that power
is unimportant to them. Yet, to others, they may look more like
paragons of power than paragons of virtue. Importantly, such
discrepancies may easily arise for other abstract values, such as
freedom, equality, or helpfulness. People can vary in how much
importance they consciously ascribe to these ideals, and it is an
open question whether their conscious ascriptions reﬂect how
they feel about the values at a deeper level. The present research
examines this issue. Focusing on power and equality in particu-
lar, we test whether implicit measures can contribute to the
assessment of values.
Values and Attitudes
Classic and contemporary measures of values have relied on
self-report measures, which ask participants to reﬂect on the rel-
ative importance of different values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz,
1992). For instance, Rokeach’s (1973) classic measure asks par-
ticipants to thoughtfully rank-order the importance of 36 values
(in two sets). In the most popular contemporary measure, the
Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992), participants are
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instructed to scan a list of values, note which ones are least and
most important, and then rate the importance of each value as a
guiding principle in their life. Also, in a more recent measure,
the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001),
participants read short portraits describing a person’s goals and
rate their own similarity to the person.
Self-reports are also the dominant method for assessing atti-
tudes. Attitudes are commonly deﬁned as tendencies to evaluate
an attitude object with some degree of favor or disfavor, and an
attitude object can be any concrete or abstract entity that we like
or dislike (Haddock & Maio, 2015). Long-standing theory and
research has supported the idea that there are strong, basic connec-
tions between values and attitudes. Theories of attitude function
(i.e., the psychological needs that attitudes fulﬁll; e.g., Herek,
1986; Katz, 1960) indicate that we can shape our attitudes to
reﬂect our personal values, and this has important ramiﬁcations
for predicting attitude change (Blankenship & Wegener, 2008)
and behavior (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1995). This view is also com-
mensurate with many studies revealing links between values and
attitudes (seeMaio & Olson, 2000, for a review).
Nevertheless, research on attitudes in the past two decades
has been greatly enhanced by the inclusion of implicit measures.
As described by Fazio and Olson (2003), implicit measures of
attitude tap spontaneous evaluations that are activated without
control and deliberation. Fazio and Olson suggest that implicit
measures assess the same attitude as explicit, self-report mea-
sures, but the implicit measures yield a snapshot of the spontane-
ous evaluations that may feed into later, downstream conscious
reports of attitudes. It is not the case that the constructs assessed
by implicit measures are any more “real” than the attitudes
assessed by explicit measures or that they have a “truth value”
(e.g., Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Hof-
mann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek
et al., 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004); implicit measures simply
assess the components of attitude that are not subject to delibera-
tion during the measurement procedure. Thus, implicit and
explicit measures of attitude are often correlated because they
assess the same attitude, but the magnitude of the correlation
depends on the extent to which conscious processing moves
people away from the spontaneous evaluations (e.g., Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2006). Thus, both measures together are more
useful than either measure alone.
An interesting issue is whether the contemporary, explicit
self-report measures of values are sufﬁcient for predicting scores
on both types of measures of attitude. While there is abundant
evidence about the utility of contemporary measures of values
for predicting responses on explicit measures of attitude (Maio
& Olson, 2000), evidence about their ability to predict implicit
measures of attitude is lacking. This is an interesting omission
because the current methods for assessing values rely on careful
thought in responding, whereas the implicit measures of attitude
capture spontaneous evaluations of an attitude object. It has
been suggested that these spontaneous evaluations are more
strongly associated with other spontaneous judgments and
actions than with more deliberate judgments and action (e.g.,
Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio
& Olson, 2003). This reasoning suggests that spontaneous eval-
uations of attitude objects should be more strongly associated
with spontaneous judgments of values–both of which escape the
complex cognitive ﬁltering that occurs during deliberative
responses to explicit measures.
Spontaneous judgments of values may be important also
because of the psychological components of values. Values tend
to be more affectively based than cognitively based (Maio &
Olson, 1998; see Maio, 2010, for a review), and mere value
priming, even without deliberative judgments of value impor-
tance, affects relevant value judgments and behavior (Maio,
Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009; Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio,
2007). Given the existence of psychological obstacles to infer-
ring our goals (e.g., Ferguson & Porter, 2010) and feelings (e.g.,
Schwarz & Clore, 1997), it may be difﬁcult for people to identi-
fy these contributions in explicit measures of values. Indeed,
such difﬁculties also occur even when inferring simpler attitudes
and our bases for them (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).
By circumventing this introspective difﬁculty and social desir-
ability, implicit measures have the potential to uncover facets of
values that are undetected in explicit measures.
How might we assess these spontaneous judgments of val-
ues? A long-standing tradition has measured motivational dispo-
sition by coding imaginative thought in stories written about
people in social situations, like a “captain speaking to a
passenger” or “persons seated on a park bench” (McClelland,
Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Schultheiss, 2008; Winter,
John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). Similar to this
approach, recent research has coded values from text in inter-
views (e.g., Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, & Riches, 2012).
However, this approach requires training, large amounts of time
for measurement (e.g., 2-hour interviews), and considerable
labor in coding. More important, this approach differs in many
ways from contemporary self-report measures (e.g., numerical
scaling, measurement structure, role of deliberation), making it
difﬁcult to know precisely how they differ from self-reports. In
contrast, implicit measures of attitude can be more closely linked
in content to explicit measures of attitude. Furthermore, given
the aforementioned evidence linking implicit measures of atti-
tude and self-report measures of values to affective processes,
these implicit measures may tap important psychological com-
ponents of values.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) is the most commonly used paradigm for
implicit measurement. Notwithstanding some important limita-
tions and controversies (e.g., Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke,
2006; Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman, 2010), numerous
studies have demonstrated the predictive validity of the IAT (see
Greenwald et al., 2009, for a meta-analysis; Perugini, Richetin,
& Zogmaister, 2010). In the applications relevant to our interest
in implicitly measuring values, researchers have adapted this
test by presenting stimuli that were theoretically related to
implicit needs or motives, ﬁnding evidence for predictive validi-
ty using both a verbal (Sheldon, King, Houser-Marko,
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Osbaldiston, & Gunz, 2007) and a Pictorial Attitude IAT (PA-
IAT; Slabbinck, De Houwer, & Van Kenhove, 2011). For exam-
ple, the PA-IAT for power presents images related to “power” or
“nonpower” as target stimuli and words related to “attractive”(e.g.,
nice, friendly) versus “non-attractive”(e.g., creepy, unpleas-
ant) as evaluative categories. Unlike our proposed implicit
measurement of values, however, these tests are focused on
abstract motives and are not grounded in values theory. For
example, Sheldon et al. (2007) contrast power with intimacy,
which is similar to the opposition between power and univer-
salism values in Schwartz’s (1992) model, but conceptually
distinct. Also, Slabbinck and colleagues (2011) focus on
attractiveness associations with social connotations (e.g.,
friendly, creepy) that are distinct from the personal connota-
tions we aim to tap. Nonetheless, these approaches provide
evidence that it may be useful to adapt an IAT to the assess-
ment of values within Schwartz’s model (1992), as we sought
to do in the present research.
Power and Prejudice
Implicit measures are particularly useful in socially sensitive
domains, as in research using implicit measures to examine prej-
udice (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Prejudice
is particularly relevant to individual differences in power versus
universalism values. In over 80 nations, Schwartz (1992) has
found that power and universalism values are on opposing ends
of the same motivational continuum; the rated importance of
power values is negatively correlated with the rated importance
of universalism values. Abundant social psychological theory
and research has documented how people who prefer status or
power over equality and social justice are more likely to exhibit
prejudice (e.g., Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002;
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The present research therefore exam-
ines the utility of implicit measures of attitudes toward power
versus universalism values in this context.
For this purpose, we developed the Attitudes toward Values
IAT (AV-IAT) to assess spontaneous attitudes toward power
versus universalism values. We did not conceptualize these
spontaneous attitudes as measuring the real values, but rather as
tapping spontaneous components of values. By taking this
approach, the AV-IAT is able to look directly at the role of eval-
uative associations with values, but it does not look at spontane-
ous relative differences in value importance. We were uncertain
whether an IAT can reliably assess spontaneous differences in
importance (which involves weighting an object relative to a
goal), and our ﬁnal study tackles this question.
As important test cases, we focused on attitudes toward peo-
ple of different ethnicity and gender. After examining the AV-
IAT in connection to these spontaneous attitudes, we examined
its ability to predict spontaneous discrimination, focusing on
bias against women in particular. We expected that higher levels
of spontaneous favorability to power over universalism (as
recorded in the AV-IAT) would signiﬁcantly predict (a) more
negative attitudes toward people of outgroup ethnicity and out-
group gender (as recorded using paper-and-pencil or computer
IATs) and (b) more discrimination against women. Moreover,
we expected that these relations would be unique, occurring
over and above the associations with self-report measures of atti-
tudes toward values. That is, instead of asking participants to
rate the importance of the values (as in standard values question-
naires), we asked participants to rate their favorability to the val-
ues included in the implicit measure of attitude to values. This
enabled greater comparability between the two levels of mea-
surement and a sterner test of the AV-IAT’s discriminant validi-
ty. If we were to contrast the AV-IAT with the contemporary
measures of values, these measures would have differed in terms
of both the type of judgment (i.e., evaluation vs. importance)
and the level of measurement (i.e., implicit vs. explicit). In con-
trast, the AV-IAT and explicit measures of attitude toward val-
ues focus on the same type of judgment, making it implausible
that any differences in predictive utility between these measures
could be attributable to the judgment dimension alone. Nonethe-
less, our ﬁnal study followed up this test with a less conservative
test of whether the AV-IAT and a value importance IAT both
exhibit predictive validity beyond contemporary measures of
values.
STUDY 1
Study 1 tested whether the implicit measurement of attitudes
toward values can help to predict attitudes toward ethnic groups.
In one sample, we used the power versus universalism values
AV-IAT to predict attitudes toward Arab people, a prominent
ethnic out-group in France, where Study 1 was conducted.
Studying stereotypes and prejudice toward Arab people is par-
ticularly relevant for historical reasons in France. In this nation,
spontaneous stereotypes (Chateignier, Dutrevis, Nugier, &
Chekroun, 2009) and attitudes toward Arab people tend to be
strongly negative (Dambrun & Guimond, 2004). In a separate
sample, we used the power versus universalism values AV-IAT
to predict attitudes toward Black African people. Prejudice
toward this ethnic group is a powerful test case because abun-
dant research has shown prejudice against this group using both
explicit and implicit measures (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Wit-
tenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001).
Across both target groups, Study 1 tested whether the ethnic
in-group/out-group bias shown in IATs was predictable from
differences in spontaneous evaluations of power and universal-
ism values. Moreover, because of positive relations between
power values and achievement values and between universalism
values and benevolence values (see Schwartz, 1992), we also
wished to test whether any effects of an implicit measure of atti-
tudes toward power versus universalism values occurred inde-
pendently of an implicit measure of attitudes toward
achievement versus benevolence values. Distinct effects of the
implicit measure of attitudes toward power-universalism values
would support the hypothesis that these values are uniquely
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connected to the in-group versus out-group bias, and such evi-
dence would provide further testimony to the validity of the new
implicit measures of attitudes toward values. Study 1 also pro-
vided a further test of the discriminant validity of the AV-IAT,
by using it to predict implicit ethnic in-group bias independently
of explicitly reported attitudes to values.
Method
Participants
Sample for Prediction of Prejudice Against Arabs. Ninety-
ﬁve participants (21 women; Mage5 21.58, SD5 1.98) com-
pleted the study in groups of 15 to 20 during lectures. All par-
ticipants were of French nationality, but 15 participants had at
least one parent who was born in Morocco, Tunisia, or Alge-
ria, and seven additional participants had at least one grand-
parent from one of these countries.
Sample for Prediction of Prejudice Against Black
Africans. Ninety-seven participants (27 women;Mage5 28.23,
SD5 14.22) completed the study in groups of 3 to 20 within
university. All participants were of French nationality, but four
participants had at least one parent originating from a Black
African country,1 and one additional participant had at least one
grandparent from one of these countries.
Procedure. Participants were told that they were taking part in
a study of personality. They completed a ﬂower-insect paper-
and-pencil IAT as practice before completing a power-
universalism AV-IAT, an achievement-benevolence AV-IAT,
and a paper-and-pencil IAT for the target group of interest (i.e.,
Arabs or Black Africans). The appendix lists the items within
the IATs (Table 1A). Participants then completed explicit mea-
sures of attitudes toward power, universalism, achievement,
benevolence, French people, and either Arabs or Black Africans.
Finally, participants were debriefed.
Paper-and-pencil IATs are based on the original computer-
ized version of the IAT. The paper-and-pencil version calculates
scores using timed classiﬁcations on paper instead of reaction
times on computer. Both versions are in wide use, and they
reveal similar effects (e.g., Sekaquaptewa, Vargas, & Von
Hippel, 2010; Vargas, Sekaquaptewa, & Von Hippel, 2007).
However, the paper-and-pencil IAT is easily presented to large
groups and is less costly to implement.
Measures
Flower-Insect IAT. For practice, we ﬁrst gave participants
a paper-and-pencil IAT assessing favorability toward ﬂowers
versus insects. The measure presented columns of 24 words on
different pages. Participants chose whether words such as dai-
sies, tulips, bugs, and mosquitoes belonged to the concept cate-
gory “ﬂowers” or “insects,” and whether words such as
wonderful, joyful, terrible, or nasty belonged to the evaluative
category “good” or “bad.” The concept and evaluative catego-
ries were simultaneously paired in two conﬁgurations. In the
ﬁrst conﬁguration (ﬁrst page), the categories “ﬂowers-good”
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Implicit Measures Across the FiveStudies
ND D SD t(0) 95% CI 2 3
Study 1 Pow-U AV-IAT 17.57% –.94 2.95 23.74* [–1.45, –.44] .60** .27**
Achi-B AV-IAT 16.36% –.52 2.95 22.07* [–1.02, –.02] .17*
Race IAT 4.24% 2.15 2.24 12.05** [1.79, 2.50] –
Arab IAT 2.73% 2.01 2.45 6.9** [1.82, 2.70]
Black IAT 5.04% 2.26 2.06 10.2** [1.42, 2.58]
Sum 12.7%
Study 2 Pow-U AV-IAT 6.9% –.30 .52 25.13** [–.42, –.18] .43** .28*
Achi-B AV-IAT 4.65% –.15 .47 22.94** [–.25, –.05] .02
Black IAT 3.4% .38 .37 9.17** [.29, .46] –
Sum 5.03%
Study 3 Black IAT Pow 1 1.8% 2.48 2.47 7.23** [1.79, 3.17]
Black IAT Control 5.6% 1.71 2.07 5.83** [1.12, 2.30]
Black IAT Uni 1 7.6% 1.11 2.10 3.65** [.49, 1.71]
Sum 5.6% 1.78 2.28 9.57** [1.41, 2.15]
Study 4 Pow-U AV-IAT 37.8% –.68 2.78 21.87 [–1.41, .04] .24 .31*
Achi-B AV-IAT 31.5% –.34 2.62 21.04 [–1.0, .31] –.02
Gender IAT 7.3% 1.81 1.67 10.14** [1.45, 2.16] –
Sum 25.6%
Study 5 Pow–U AV–IAT 22.76% 21.66 2.84 25.71** [–2.24,–1.08] .46** .24*
Pow–U ImpIAT 17.88% –.44 2.35 21.891 [–.91, .02] .27**
Black IAT 5.69% 1.85 2.30 8.66** [1.43, 2.27]
Sum 15.44%
Note. ND5 number of deletions; D5D–score calculated according to Lane et al. (2005) for Studies 1, 3, and 4 and Greenwald et al. (2003) for Study 2; t(0)5 t–
test from 0; 95% CI5 95% confidence interval; Pow–U5 power–universalism; Achi–B5 achievement-benevolence; Imp5 importance.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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(top left side) and “insects-bad” (top right side) were paired,
whereas in the second conﬁguration (second page), the catego-
ries “ﬂowers-bad” (top left side) and “insects-good” (top right
side) were paired. We counterbalanced the order of the conﬁgu-
rations across participants.
Participants worked their way down the column of words,
placing a checkmark in a response bubble to the left or right of
each word to indicate the column category to which the word
belonged. Participants were asked to work as quickly and accu-
rately as possible, but to continue without stopping if mistakes
occurred. Participants were given 20 seconds to classify as
many words as possible on each page. Participants were then
asked to note the new category pairings on the second page
before the timed classiﬁcation task began again.
Power Versus Universalism and Achievement Versus
Benevolence AV-IAT. The AV-IAT for assessing attitudes
toward power over universalism values and achievement versus
benevolence values used the same structure as the practice IAT,
except that the stimulus words were related to power values
(e.g., authority, wealth), universalism values (e.g., equality,
social justice), achievement values (e.g., ambitious, successful),
or benevolence values (e.g., forgiving, helpful). The value words
were adapted from the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz,
1992), and the adjectives were the same as those in the practice
paper-and-pencil IAT.
French People Versus Arab or Black African People
IAT. The paper-and-pencil IAT assessing attitudes to French
versus Arab people or French versus Black African people used
the same structure as the ﬂowers versus insects IAT, except that
the stimuli included words (i.e., ﬁrst name) that were related to
“French people,” “Arab people,” and “Black African people.”
Scoring. For each implicit measure, the variable of interest
was the difference in the number of correctly classiﬁed items
under the two category pairings. Participants generally classify
the stimuli faster when the paired categories match their auto-
matic attitudes toward the category (e.g., “ﬂowers” paired with
good and “insects” paired with bad) than when they are mis-
matched. Before calculating the IAT scores, we followed prior
research by ﬁrst excluding participants who failed to classify at
least eight items per page and who made more than 20% errors
by page (e.g., Lane, Mitchell, & Banaji, 2005). Scores were then
calculated as 6[maximum/minimum]*(maximum-minimum),
where maximum is the number of correctly categorized items on
the block for which participants completed more correct items,
and minimum is the number of items correctly categorized on
the block for which they completed fewer correct items. This
algorithm is based on analyses of simulated data sets that mirror
the distribution of general IAT effects. According to Lane et al.
(2005), this algorithm (a) best accounts for the difference
between the number of items completed and individual differ-
ences in speed in completing categorization tasks in general, (b)
minimizes the inﬂuence of extreme scores, and (c) reduces the
overall skewness of the data distribution.
In the analysis of the French people–out-group ethnicity
paper-and-pencil IAT, we multiplied scores by 21 if the maxi-
mum scores arose from the French people–negative and out-
group ethnicity–positive block, thereby making higher scores
indicate more positivity to French over out-group ethnicity peo-
ple. In the analysis of the power-universalism AV-IAT and
achievement versus benevolence AV-IAT, we multiplied scores
by 21 if the maximum scores arose from the power-negative
and universalism-positive block, or achievement-negative and
benevolence-positive block, thereby making higher scores indi-
cate more positivity to power values and more negativity to uni-
versalism values or more positivity to achievement values and
more negativity to benevolence values.
Explicit Measures. Participants were asked to rate their
feelings about power, universalism, achievement, benevolence,
Arab people, Black African people, or French people using 7-
point semantic differential scales ranging from 23 (bad) to 13
(good). Each values category was described using three values
items representing the category (e.g., social justice, equality, and
broad-mindedness for universalism values).
Results and Discussion
After excluding Arab and Black African descendants (because of
their relevance to our measures of prejudice), we combined the
subsamples (N5 165) by creating measures of French-national
versus ethnic out-group attitude. We did this for three reasons: (a)
the variable we were interested in was “out-group attitude,” and
each group was a similar instance of an ethnic out-group; (b) this
combination improves power; and (c) the power-universalism
AV-IAT predicts implicit prejudice in each group separately. Fur-
thermore, a regression analysis including a dummy code to repre-
sent the ethnicity of the target alongside the implicit predictors,
model R25 .13, F(7, 109)5 2.29, p5 .03, revealed no signiﬁcant
interactions with the dummy code (bs5 –.06 to .15, ps> .59).
Table 1 shows the exclusions that resulted from applying the rec-
ommended exclusion criteria for the paper-and-pencil IATs.2
Implicit Measures. Table 1 presents descriptive data for the
IATs. The D-scores show that participants in this study exhib-
ited signiﬁcantly less spontaneous favorability to power than to
universalism and less spontaneous favorability to achievement
than to benevolence. Furthermore, congruent with Schwartz’s
(1992) model, participants who were spontaneously more favor-
able to power (vs. universalism) values were also more likely to
show greater spontaneous favorability to achievement (vs.
benevolence) values. Also, participants were more negative to
the ethnic out-groups than to French people.
Explicit Measures. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics
for the explicit measures. Participants explicitly evaluated power
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less favorably than universalism, t(164)5210.06, p< .001,
and judged achievement as favorably as benevolence,
t(164)521.14, ns. Participants were more favorable to people
of French origin than to the ethnic out-groups, t(164)5 2.26,
p< .03. In addition, congruent with Schwartz’s (1992) model,
participants who evaluated power more favorably also evaluated
achievement more favorably, and participants who evaluated
universalismmore favorably evaluated benevolence more favor-
ably (see Table 3).3
Prediction of Prejudice. Table 3 presents the correlations
among all our implicit and explicit measures. For the sake of
brevity, we highlight the ﬁndings most pertinent to our predic-
tions regarding power versus universalism. The results show
that more spontaneous positivity to power (vs. universalism) on
the AV-IATwas associated with a spontaneous negative attitude
to the ethnic out-groups on the prejudice IAT. Looking at the
explicit measures, participants who evaluated power more
positively were not signiﬁcantly more negative to the ethnic out-
groups than to French people, whereas ratings of universalism
were associated with more positivity to the ethnic out-groups.
A regression analysis, R25 .09, F(4, 112)5 2.77, p5 .03,
was conducted to test whether the power-universalism AV-IAT
continued to predict spontaneous prejudice after controlling for
achievement-benevolence AV-IAT scores and the explicit mea-
sures of attitudes toward power versus universalism and
achievement versus benevolence. Results indicated that the
implicit measure of attitudes toward power versus universalism
continued to predict the French–out-group IAT score (b5 .24,
p5 .04, ˛2p5 .04), but the implicit measure of attitudes to
achievement versus benevolence (b5 .06, ns), the explicit atti-
tudes to power-universalism score (b5 –.12, ns), and the
explicit attitudes to achievement-benevolence scores did
not (b5 .11, ns). Thus, the power-universalism AV-IAT
explained variance in spontaneous prejudice that was not
explained by the explicit measures of attitudes to the values and
the implicit and explicit measures of achievement versus benev-
olence values.
STUDY 2
Study 1 provided provocative evidence for the utility of mea-
suring values with an implicit measure, using the paper-and-
pencil AV-IAT to measure relative favorability to power ver-
sus universalism values. While paper-and-pencil IATs reveal
effects that are similar to those found in computer IATs (e.g.,
Sekaquaptewa et al., 2010; Vargas et al., 2007), replication
with a computer-based IAT would provide convergent sup-
port. Thus, in Study 2, we assessed values and prejudice to
Black African people using the original computer-based IAT.
No explicit measures were included because we primarily
sought replication of the implicit associations.
Table 2 Study 1: Descriptive Statistics for Explicit measures
Attitude Measures ND a M SD 95% CI
Power values 0 .91 .48 1.15 [.30, .66]
Universalism values 0 .92 1.59 .89 [1.46, 1.73]
Power-universalism 0 – 21.11 1.42 [–1.33, –.89]
Achievement values 0 .94 1.95 .98 [1.80, 2.10]
Benevolence values 0 .93 2.05 .87 [1.92, 2.19]
Achievement-benevolence values 0 – –.10 1.10 [2.26, .07]
French 0 .96 .78 1.01 [.63, .94]
Arab 0 .95 .53 .98 [.30, .76]
Black African 0 .96 .69 1.01 [.48, .90]
Out-group 0 .95 .62 1.01 [.47, .77]
Fr-Out-group 0 – .16 .93 [.02,.31]
Note. ND5 number of deletions or missing data; 95% CI5 95% confidence
interval.
Table 3 Study 1: Correlations Between Implicit and Explicit Measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. PU IAT – .60** .27** .33** 2.21* .40** .24** 2.09 .30** .04 2.09 .13
2. AB IAT – .17* .24* .005 .19* .36** .01 .32** .11 .14 2.02
3. Race IAT – .01 2.11 .08 .09 2.05 .13 .08 2.151 .23**
4. Power – .05 .77** .42** 2.11 .46** 2.09 2.11 .02
5. Uni – 2.58** .16* .46** 2.21** .12 .27** 2.16*
6. Pow-Uni – .24* 2.37** .51** 2.151 2.27** .12
7. Achi – .29** .65** .151 .10 .05
8. Ben – 2.53** .23** .25** 2.01
9. Achi-Ben – 2.05 2.10 .05
10. French – .56** .47**
11. Out-group – 2.45**
12. Fr-Out –
Note. PU IAT5 power-universalism AV-IAT; AB IAT5achievement-benevolence AV-IAT; Race IAT5attitude toward French versus ethnic out-groups IAT; Power,
Uni, Achi, and Ben5 explicit measures of attitude toward power, universalism, achievement, and benevolence; French and Out-group5 explicit measures of attitude
toward French people and the ethnic out-group people. Ns vary between 119 and 165 due to missing data on the power-universalism AV-IAT, the achievement-
benevolence AV-IAT, and the attitude toward French versus ethnic out-groups IAT.
1p< .06. *p< .05. **p< .01
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Method
Participants. Eighty-six participants (36 women; Mage5
30.10, SD5 11.38) completed the study individually. All partic-
ipants were of French nationality without parents or grandpar-
ents originating from a Black African nation.
Procedure. Participants were told that they were taking part in
a study of categorization under time pressure. They completed
three IATs using Inquisit(web) software: a ﬁve-word power-uni-
versalism AV-IAT, a ﬁve-word achievement-benevolence AV-
IAT, and a ﬁve-word French versus Black African IAT. Partici-
pants were instructed to categorize words as quickly as possible
while also being accurate. The IAT is composed of three practice
blocks (omitted for analyses) and four critical blocks. We illus-
trate the measure by describing the critical blocks in the AV-
IAT for power-universalism. In the ﬁrst pair of critical blocks
(20 trials and then 40 trials) following two practice blocks, par-
ticipants categorized words related to power/universalism values
and good/bad words on alternating trials. For example, partici-
pants may have categorized power values and good words with
one key and universalism values and bad words with another
key. (Half of the participants would have had the reverse key
assignments.) In the second pair of critical blocks (20 trials and
then 40 trials), participants categorized pairings opposite to the
ones in the ﬁrst pair of critical blocks. For each IAT, the two
pairs of critical blocks were counterbalanced (between partici-
pants) to control for potential order effects, and the position of
the “good/bad” categories was also randomized between
participants.
The IATs were scored with the D algorithm recommended
by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). A positive D-score
indicated faster responding on average when power values,
achievement values, or French people were paired with good
words and universalism values, benevolence values, or Black
African people were paired with bad words compared with the
reverse. Positive scores indicate a preference for power values
compared to universalism values, a preference for achievement
values compared to benevolence values, and a preference for
French people compared to Black African people.
Split-Half Correlations. To assess the internal consistency of
the D-IAT scores, we used the standard procedure: We calculat-
ed split-half reliabilities over the differences scores of Block 6/3
and Block 7/4 (Schnabel, Asendorpf, & Greenwald, 2008).
After applying the Spearman-Brown correction, split-half corre-
lations for the power-universalism AV-IAT, r(82)5 .76,
p< .001, achievement-benevolence AV- IAT, r(82)5 .78,
p< .001, and French–ethnic out-group IAT, r(85)5 .67,
p< .001, were large and signiﬁcant.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents the correlations between the three IATs. As in
Study 1, spontaneous positivity to power (vs. universalism) was
associated with more spontaneous negativity to the ethnic out-
group. In contrast, spontaneous positivity to achievement (vs.
benevolence) was uncorrelated with spontaneous attitude to the
ethnic out-group.
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to test whether
the power-universalism AV-IAT continued to predict spontane-
ous prejudice after controlling for achievement-benevolence
AV-IAT scores. The total effect of both predictors was signiﬁ-
cant, R25 .08, F(2, 70)5 3.28, p5 .04. As in Study 1, results
indicated that the implicit measure of attitudes to power versus
universalism continued to predict the French–out-group IAT
score (b5 .32, p5 .01, ˛2p5 .08), but the implicit measure of
attitudes to achievement versus benevolence (b5 –.11, ns) did
not. Thus, as expected, the power versus universalism AV-IAT,
but not the achievement versus benevolence AV-IAT, again pre-
dicted spontaneous prejudice.
STUDY 3
Numerous studies have shown that it is possible to change
implicitly measured attitudes through classical conditioning
(e.g., De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005; Olson & Fazio,
2001). In Study 3, we wanted to test whether the application of
this approach to power and universalism values would inﬂuence
spontaneous prejudice to Black African people. Extending the
results of Studies 1 and 2, we expected that conditioning partici-
pants to form more positive associations with power values and
more negative associations with universalism values would
cause more spontaneous prejudice than conditioning partici-
pants to form opposite-valenced associations with the values.
This ﬁnding would provide support for the idea that there is a
causal inﬂuence of these associations, which is an issue that
could not be addressed in the correlational designs used for
Studies 1 and 2.
It is worth noting that there is a lot of evidence that condition-
ing may also inﬂuence explicitly reported attitudes (Hofmann,
De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Nonethe-
less, the social undesirability of prejudice makes it difﬁcult to
assess the impact of conditioned associations on explicit mea-
sures of prejudice. Furthermore, our particular interest was in
verifying the role of associations with power and universalism
in spontaneous prejudice. Therefore, we did not explicitly mea-
sure prejudice in this study.
Method
Participants and Procedure. One hundred ﬁfty-nine partici-
pants took part in groups of 15 to 20 during lectures. The sample
included 71 women and 88 men, with a mean age of 20.89 years
(SD5 2.54). The experiment employed a three-level (power-
positive/universalism-negative vs. power-negative/universal-
ism-positive vs. control) between-subjects design. Participants
ﬁrst completed a paper-and-pencil ﬂower-insect IAT (Green-
wald et al., 1998) as practice. Next, some participants were
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randomly assigned to a condition training them to associate
either power values with positive adjectives and universalism
values with negative adjectives (n5 53) or power values with
negative adjectives and universalism values with positive adjec-
tives (n5 52). A third group of control participants (n5 54)
simply proceeded to the dependent measure, which was a paper-
and-pencil French versus Black African IAT completed by all
participants. The IATs were identical to those used in the previ-
ous studies, so we describe here only the experimental
manipulation.
Experimental Manipulation
Power-Positive/Universalism-Negative Versus Power-
Negative/Universalism-Positive Conditions. In the power-
positive/universalism-negative condition, participants were giv-
en a page containing two columns. In the ﬁrst column, 36 words
related to one of the four categories (i.e., universalism, power,
positive, and negative) were given in random order. Three items
were presented for each of the four categories, with all items
repeated three times. These items were the same as those used
during the IATs in the previous studies. In the second column,
which was left blank, participants wrote an item corresponding
to a speciﬁc association. If the item in the left was related to
“power” (e.g., authority), participants were asked write one of
the three items related to “positive” (i.e., wonderful, joyful,
excellent). If the item in the left column was related to
“universalism” (e.g., social justice), participants were asked to
choose and write one of the three items related to “negative”
(i.e., terrible, nasty, horrible) in the right column. Also, if the
item on the left was related to “positive” (e.g., wonderful), par-
ticipants were asked to write one of the three items related to
“power” (e.g., wealth), and if the item on the left was related to
“negative” (e.g., nasty), participants were asked to write one of
the three items related to “universalism” (e.g., equality). A simi-
lar procedure was employed in the power-negative/universal-
ism-positive condition, except that participants paired power
values with negative adjectives and universalism values with
positive adjectives. The experimenter asked the participants to
be as creative as possible by trying not using the same items
repeatedly, but using equally all three items per category. This
instruction helped to ensure that participants thought carefully
about each response.
Participants completed this learning procedure across four
blocks of trials in each of the two experimental conditions. In the
ﬁrst block, participants were given no time limit to complete the
associations. Participants were given 2 minutes for the second
block, 1 minute in the third block, and only 30 seconds in the last
block. The increasing time constraints were intended to ensure
that the associations became progressively more automatic.
Results and Discussion
The D-scores shown in Table 1 reveal that participants’ sponta-
neous evaluations of French people were signiﬁcantly more
positive than their spontaneous evaluations of Black African
people. This pattern was replicated within each experimental
condition. More relevant to our hypotheses, a three-level
between-subjects ANOVA revealed that D-scores signiﬁcantly
differed between conditions, F(2, 147)5 4.77, p< .01,
˛2p5 .061. As expected, Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses
revealed that prejudice D-scores were higher in the power-posi-
tive/universalism-negative condition (Table 1) than in the pow-
er-negative/universalism-positive condition (p< .01). This
effect was symmetrical: Prejudice D-scores in the control condi-
tion trended lower than D-scores in the power-positive/univer-
salism-negative condition (p5 .08) and higher than D-scores in
the power-negative/universalism-positive condition (p5 .17),
but neither effect reached conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
Overall, the results indicate that associations with power and
universalism values inﬂuence prejudice, converging with the
correlational evidence yielded by the AV-IATs in the ﬁrst two
studies.
STUDY 4
Our fourth study tested whether the power-universalism AV-
IAT predicts attitudes to a third important target group: women.
Prior research has demonstrated the utility of implicit measures
of gender attitude (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Skowronski &
Lawrence, 2001), and we wished to test whether scores on these
implicit measures can be predicted by the power-universalism
AV-IAT. If greater spontaneous favorability to power over uni-
versalism values is associated with greater general favorability
to dominant over nondominant groups, then people with higher
scores on the power-universalism AV-IAT should be more like-
ly to express greater spontaneous favorability to men over
women.
Because spontaneous attitudes can be important predictors of
spontaneous behavior (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Perugini et al.,
2010; cf. Greenwald et al., 2009), we also wished to test whether
the power-universalism AV-IAT could predict spontaneous
gender-related behavior. Here, we capitalized on our experience
studying gender biases in sports referees. For example, we have
found that referees in handball matches exhibit a particular style
of bias against female players (e.g., Souchon et al., 2009; Sou-
chon, Livingstone, & Maio, 2013). (Handball is a team sport
that has been in the Olympic Games for over 40 years.) Referees
of both genders award free throws more frequently to female
victims of a foul (in games between women) than to male vic-
tims of a similar foul (in games between men), and the referees
also punish female aggressors (in women’s games) more severe-
ly than male aggressors (in men’s games) who have committed
the same type of foul. That is, aggression in women’s handball
games is censured more strongly than aggression in men’s hand-
ball games–a pattern that has also been observed in soccer (Cou-
lomb-Cabagno, Rascle, & Souchon, 2005) and in basketball
(Graf, Yabko, & Christensen, 2009). These biases are mani-
fested without awareness and deliberation (e.g., under time
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pressure and cognitive busyness). We were therefore interested
in testing whether this spontaneous bias is predictable by sponta-
neous evaluations of power and universalism values. Conse-
quently, the main objective of Study 4 was to replicate the
power-universalism AV-IAT’s predictive validity by studying
men’s spontaneous gender attitudes and their quick decision
making regarding ambiguous fouls during men’s and women’s
handball matches, while under time pressure.
To further probe the AV-IAT’s discriminant validity, we
assessed individual differences in hostile sexism (HS) and
benevolent sexism (BS; Glick & Fiske, 1996). HS is an adver-
sarial view of gender relations in which women are perceived as
seeking to control men, whether through sexuality or feminist
ideology, whereas BS is deﬁned as a subjectively chivalrous ide-
ology that offers protection and affection to women who
embrace conventional roles. People who exhibit high HS and
BS also attach signiﬁcantly more importance to power values
and less importance to universalism values (Feather, 2004).
Thus, it was interesting to test whether HS and BS predict differ-
ences in spontaneous favorability to power and universalism
values and, for the purpose of further establishing the unique
predictive validity of the power-universalism AV-IAT, whether
this measure predicts gender bias independently of any associa-
tions it has with HS or BS.
Method
Participants and Procedure. Participants examined video-
recorded events during handball games. Thus, we used handball
players as participants because familiarity with this game and its
rules were essential. We expected handball players to replicate
the biases seen in referees (e.g., Frank & Gillovich, 1988; Sou-
chon et al., 2013). Our sample comprised 95 experienced male
handball players (Mage5 24.16, SD5 5.19; Mexperience5 12.45
years, SD5 6.56) who competed on a local (n5 15), intermedi-
ate (n5 30), or national level (n5 50).
Participants completed (a) a refereeing decision task, (b) a set
of paper-and-pencil implicit measures (practice IAT, power-
universalism AV-IAT, achievement-benevolence AV-IAT, gen-
der IAT), and (c) a set of explicit measures (attitudes to power,
universalism, achievement, and benevolence values; sexism).
The implicit and explicit measures of attitudes to values were
the same as in Study 1. The measure of sexism was a validated
French translation (Dardenne, Delacollette, Gregoire, & Lecocq,
2006) of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske,
1996), with 22 items (a5 .83 for HS; a5 .69 for BS).
The experimenter explained that the aim of the study was to
better understand referees’ decision making in handball games
and that participants would also be asked to complete unrelated
measures of attitudes for a different purpose. Finally, partici-
pants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
Refereeing Task. Each participant watched two digital videos
on a 1.423 1.88 m display. The principal content of each video
comprised 10 handball situations with male players or 10 situa-
tions with female players. In each situation, the player in posses-
sion of the ball missed his or her shot at the goal after a
transgression from a defensive player, and the transgressions
were chosen to be very similar between male and female play-
ers. Using the ﬁrst author’s expertise on handball refereeing, we
selected 72 pairs of very similar situations between male players
and between female players from a large sample of videotaped
games. For each of these pairs, 12 national referees answered
the following two questions on a scale ranging from 1 (absolute-
ly not) to 5 (strongly similar): (a) “In your opinion, are the two
situations identical/strictly comparable as regards the decision-
making processes that are involved?” and (b) “Is the intensity of
contact really identical/strictly comparable from your point of
view?” Pairs of situations were selected only when there was
near-unanimous agreement between the 12 national referees,
enabling us to be certain that male and female players in these
situations should ofﬁciate the same way (see also Frank & Gillo-
vich, 1988; Souchon et al., 2013). Moreover, the situations pre-
sented in the videos for men’s and women’s games were chosen
to be very similar at each position in the sequence (i.e., ﬁrst foul,
second foul). For each participant, this presentation order and
the order of the two videos were randomized.
For each of the 20 (10 3 2) situations, participants had to
make two decisions. First, they decided whether or not to inter-
vene, using a scale ranging from 1 (absolutely certain that play
should continue without intervention) to 9 (absolutely certain
that the ball should be returned to the victim). After making this
decision for all situations, participants viewed the videos again
and made disciplinary decisions regarding the offender, using a
scale ranging from 1 (absolutely certain that the defensive play-
er does not have to be punished through a 2-min exclusion) to 9
(absolutely certain that the defensive player has to be punished
through a 2-min exclusion). For the decisions regarding players
of both genders, the 10 intervention ratings and the 10 disciplin-
ary ratings were averaged to form indices of the intervention
decisions (a5 .56) and the disciplinary decisions (a5 .77).
Higher scores indicated more certainty about intervention and
greater punitiveness to the transgressor. Because participants
were unaware that we were comparing responses to male and
female players, the measurement of their decision making was
indirect and, to their knowledge, not related to gender.
Before each video, participants were given four training sit-
uations, which were very similar across the videos containing
male players and female players at each step in the presentation
sequence. Following each situation (training and target), partici-
pants received a 2-second countdown to make their refereeing
decision. A sound effect after 2 seconds signaled the presenta-
tion of the next situation. This rapid pace created a realistic time
pressure and prevented extensive thought about the decision,
while allowing for the fact that participants were not experienced
referees. In this way, the participants’ decisions under time pres-
sure were relatively spontaneous, but within enough time for
them to make their decisions.
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Results and Discussion
Implicit Measures. Mean AV-IAT effects in our sample were
calculated using the same procedure as in Studies 1 and 3. The
D-scores in Table 1 show that participants’ spontaneous evalua-
tions of power and universalism did not differ signiﬁcantly. Sim-
ilarly, participants’ spontaneous evaluations of achievement and
benevolence did not differ. As in Study 2, and congruent with
Schwartz’s (1992) model, participants who were more favorable
to power on the power-universalism AV-IAT were more likely
to show greater favorability to achievement on the achievement-
benevolence AV-IAT (see Table 5). In addition, Table 1 shows
that participants’ spontaneous attitude to men was more positive
than to women. Given that our sample was male, this ﬁnding is
congruent with evidence that spontaneous gender attitudes tend
to favor the in-group (Rudman& Goodwin, 2004).
Explicit Measures. Table 4 indicates that participants
expressed less positivity to power than to universalism,
t(94)524.80, p< .001, and they endorsed achievement more
than benevolence values, t(94)5 4.43, p< .001. Participants’
hostile sexism scores were higher than their benevolent sexism
scores, t(92)5 2.81, p< .01. Fitting Schwartz’s (1992) model,
participants who were more favorable to power were more
favorable to achievement (see Table 5).
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
Correlations Between Related Constructs Measured
Implicitly or Explicitly. Table 5 indicates that participants
who scored higher on the power-universalism AV-IAT
expressed both lesser favorability to universalism and greater
favorability to power over universalism on the explicit measure.
Similarly, participants who scored higher on the achievement-
benevolence AV-IAT expressed both lesser favorability to
benevolence and greater favorability to achievement over
benevolence on the explicit measure. Participants who scored
higher on the gender IAT did not express signiﬁcantly higher
hostile and benevolent sexism, consistent with other evidence of
discrepancies between IAT measures of in-group bias and self-
reports of such bias (Greenwald & Nosek, 2009).
Predicting Spontaneous Gender Bias. As expected,
spontaneous favorability to power versus universalism predicted
spontaneous positivity to men over women (see Table 1). In
contrast, as described in Table 5, explicit favorability to power
or universalism did not predict spontaneous attitudes to men
over women. This spontaneous gender bias was not signiﬁcantly
predicted by scores on the achievement-benevolence AV-IAT,
but it was unexpectedly linked to explicit favorability to
benevolence.
Predicting Hostile and Benevolent Sexism. As shown
in Table 5, participants who scored higher on the power-
universalism AV-IAT did not express higher hostile or benevo-
lent sexism. Similarly, participants who scored higher on the
Table 4 Study 4: Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Measures
ND a M SD 95% CI
Power values 0 .92 .79 1.24 [.53, 1.04]
Universalism values 0 .93 1.56 1.11 [1.34, 1.79]
Power-universalism values 0 – 2.77 1.56 [–1.08, 2.45]
Achievement values 0 .87 2.52 .62 [2.39, 2.65]
Benevolence values 0 .91 2.10 .86 [1.92, 2.28]
Achievement-benevolence values 0 – .42 .92 [.23, .61]
Ambivalent sexism 2 .80 2.67 .66 [2.53, 2.81]
Hostile sexism 2 .83 2.82 .90 [2.64, 3.01]
Benevolent sexism 2 .69 2.51 .78 [2.35, 2.68]
Note. ND5 number of deletions or missing data; 95% CI5 95% confidence
interval.
Table 5 Study 4: Correlations Between Refereeing Bias and Implicit and Explicit Measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. PU IAT – .241 .31* .27* .09 2.46** .39** .11 2.14 .21 .02 .06 .05
2. AB IAT – 2.02 2.06 .06 2.12 .14 .10 2.211 .231 .15 .19 .211
3. G IAT – 2.05 .02 2.15 .12 .02 2.21* .21* .13 .14 .171
4. Gen bias – 2.09 .08 2.12 .01 2.04 .05 .03 2.05 2.01
5. Pow – .11 .77** .33** .10 .12 .16 .15 .201
6. Uni – 2.61** .04 .33** 2.28* .02 .15 .10
7. Pow-Uni – .23* 2.15 .30** .11 .01 .08
8. Achi – .26* .42** .08 .24* .201
9. Ben – 2.75** 2.10 .26* .08
10. Achi-Ben – .15 2.08 .06
11. HS – .22* .82**
12. BS – .74**
13. AS –
Note. PU IAT5 power-universalism AV-IAT; AB IAT5achievement-benevolence AV-IAT; G IAT5 gender attitude IAT; Gen bias5 general refereeing bias; Pow, Uni,
Achi, and Ben5 explicit measures of attitude toward power, universalism, achievement, and benevolence; HS5 hostile sexism; BS5 benevolent sexism. Ns vary
between 56 and 95 due to missing data on the power-universalism AV-IAT, the achievement-benevolence AV-IAT, and the gender IAT.
1p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01.
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achievement-benevolence AV-IAT did not manifest signiﬁcant-
ly more hostile or benevolent sexism.
Prediction of Gender Bias in Refereeing Task. As in past
research (e.g., Souchon et al., 2009, 2013), our male participants
were signiﬁcantly more likely to intervene and discipline female
players (M5 44.88, SD5 7.08) than male players (M5 42.9,
SD5 8.47), across all cells of the 2 (video order)3 3 (competi-
tion level) 3 2 (type of decision) mixed-model design, F(1,
89)5 5.42, p5 .02, ˛2p5 .06 (without signiﬁcant reversals in
any cell). The degree of gender bias was calculated for each par-
ticipant by subtracting the intervention scores for the male play-
ers from the intervention scores for the female players and by
subtracting the disciplinary scores for the male players from the
disciplinary scores for the female players. Gender bias was cal-
culated as the mean across both types of bias, r(95)5 .25,
p5 .02. Positive scores on these indices revealed that partici-
pants were more severe against fouls made by female players
than by male players. As shown in Table 5, participants who
were spontaneously more favorable to power versus universal-
ism, but not participants who were spontaneously more favor-
able to achievement versus benevolence, exhibited more gender
bias in the ofﬁciating decisions. The explicit measures of atti-
tudes to values and sexism did not signiﬁcantly predict the gen-
der bias.
Regression Analyses Predicting Gender Attitude and
Decision Bias. Similar to Study 1, a regression analysis,
R25 .20, F(4, 44)5 2.73, p5 .04, indicated that the power ver-
sus universalism AV-IAT continued to predict the gender IAT
score (b5 .42, p< .01, ˛2p5 .14), whereas the achievement ver-
sus benevolence AV-IAT (b5 –.24, ns) and the explicit mea-
sure of attitudes to power versus universalism (b5 –.04, ns) and
achievement versus benevolence (b5 .17, ns) did not. Also, in
a second regression analysis entering the gender bias against
women in the refereeing task as the criterion, the power-
universalism AV-IAT marginally predicted the general bias
(b5 .34, p5 .06, R25 .11), but the other implicit (achieve-
ment-benevolence AV-IAT, gender IAT) and explicit measures
(attitude to power vs. universalism and achievement vs. benevo-
lence) did not. However, the overall model in this analysis was
not reliable, F(5, 43)5 1.01, p5 .42, because of the inclusion
of many weak predictors. We therefore conducted two regres-
sion analyses that included the power-universalism AV-IAT
alongside the other explicit or implicit measures. The power ver-
sus universalism AV-IAT continued to predict the gender bias
(b5 .38, p< .01, ˛2p5 .12) after controlling for the explicit
measures of attitude to power versus universalism (b5 –.22, ns)
and achievement versus benevolence (b5 –.11, ns), overall
R25 .14, F(3, 54)5 2.99, p5 .03. The power-universalism
AV-IAT continued to predict the gender bias (b5 .35, p5 .01,
˛2p5 .12) after controlling for the achievement versus benevo-
lence AV-IAT (b5 –.11, ns), R25 .12, F(2, 48)5 3.24,
p5 .04.
Summary
As expected, the power versus universalism AV-IAT uniquely
predicted spontaneous attitudes to gender and gender bias
against women in the refereeing task. Thus, the implicit measure
of attitudes to these values again explained variance in spontane-
ous judgments and action that could not be accounted for by the
other measures.
STUDY 5
Our ﬁnal study tested whether the power-universalism AV-IAT
correlates with a new power-universalism IAT that focuses on
importance judgments and whether both predict implicitly mea-
sured prejudice. As outlined in our introduction, values are theo-
retically deﬁned according to an importance dimension (e.g.,
Schwartz, 1992), but these importance judgments are strongly
linked to affective responses to values (see Maio, 2010, for a
review). Because of the lack of an empirical precedent for
assessing judgments of importance with an implicit measure, we
were less conﬁdent that implicit measures of value importance
could tap these affective responses to values effectively. None-
theless, the AV-IAT should tap these affective associations,
which should also predict the implicit measurement of impor-
tance attached to values if both types of implicit measure con-
verge on these associations.
Also, to provide a stricter test of the unique validity of the
AV-IATs, the previous studies used an explicit measure of atti-
tude to power and universalism, instead of an explicit measure
of value importance. This approach enabled the implicit and
explicit measures to assess the same type of judgment (i.e., atti-
tudinal evaluations) instead of different types of judgment (i.e.,
evaluations vs. importance). Study 5 also included a standard
explicit measure of value importance. We expected that both the
AV-IAT for power versus universalism values and the new
implicit measure of the importance of these values would predict
implicit prejudice, over and above the explicit importance of
power versus universalism values.
Method
Participants and Procedure. One hundred thirty-six partici-
pants (48 women; Mage5 19.95, SD5 2.50) completed the
study in groups of 10 to 25 within university. All participants
were of French nationality, but 13 participants had at least one
parent originating from a Black African country and were there-
fore excluded from analyses. Participants were told that they
were taking part in a study of personality. They completed a set
of paper-and-pencil implicit measures (practice IAT, power-
universalism AV-IAT, importance vs. unimportance power-
universalism IAT, French vs. Black African IAT) and a set of
explicit measures (attitudes to power, universalism, French peo-
ple, and Black African people; importance attached to power
and universalism). The implicit and explicit measures of atti-
tudes to values and to Black African people were the same as in
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previous studies, so only the implicit and explicit measures of
value importance are described below. Finally, participants were
debriefed.
Implicit and Explicit Measures of Value Importance. The
implicit measure of the importance attached to power versus uni-
versalism values used the same structure as the evaluative IATs,
except that the stimuli did not include positive and negative
adjectives, but items that were related to importance (i.e., impor-
tant, essential, fundamental) and unimportance (e.g., unimpor-
tant, secondary, insigniﬁcant). For the explicit measures of
importance, participants completed a shortened version of the
Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992). This version con-
tained the same power (i.e., authority, social power, and wealth)
and universalism values (equality, broad-mindedness, and social
justice) used in the implicit measure, with two openness values
(i.e., freedom and stimulating life) and two conservation values
(i.e., obedience, faith). In this survey, each of the 10 values was
printed beside a deﬁnition of the value (e.g., equality, equal
opportunity for all). Participants were asked to rate each value in
terms of its importance as a guiding principle in their life, using
the 9-point scale recommended by Schwartz (1992): 21
(opposed to my values), 0 (not important), 3 (moderately impor-
tant), 6 (very important), and 7 (extremely important).
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measures. Table 1 presents descriptive data for the
IATs. As in the previous studies, the D-scores and ts show that
participants in this study exhibited signiﬁcantly less spontaneous
favorability to power than to universalism and attached less
spontaneous importance to power than to universalism values.
The correlation between both value-focused implicit measures
was moderate in size and signiﬁcant. As in Studies 1–3, the
implicit measure of prejudice found more negativity to Black
African people than to French people.
Explicit Measures. Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics
for the explicit measures. Participants explicitly evaluated power
less favorably than universalism, t(122)5212.04, p< .001,
and attached less importance to power values than universalism
values, t(122)525.21, p< .001. Participants were as favorable
to people of French origin as to Black African people,
t(122)5 –.80, p> .05. As expected, the correlations between
both value-focused explicit measures were moderated in size
and signiﬁcant (see Table 7).
Prediction of Prejudice. Table 7 presents the correlations
among all our measures. Both higher spontaneous positivity to
power (vs. universalism) and higher spontaneous importance to
power (vs. universalism) were associated with a spontaneous
negative attitude to the ethnic out-group. Looking at the explicit
measures, participants who evaluated power more favorably in
relation to universalism were more negative to Black African
Table 6 Study 5: Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Measures
Attitude Measures ND a M SD 95% CI
Power values 0 .91 2.004 1.09 [2.19, .19]
Universalism values 0 .93 1.69 1.05 [1.51, 1.88]
Power-universalism values 0 – 21.7 1.56 [–1.97, 21.42]
French 0 .96 1.17 1.21 [.95, 1.38]
Black African 0 .97 1.21 1.24 [.99, 1.43]
French–Black African 0 – 2.04 .60 [2.15, .06]
Importance measures
Power values 0 .73 2.24 2.48 [2.69, .19]
Universalism values 0 .67 1.26 .99 [1.09, 1.44]
Power-universalism values 0 – 21.51 3.21 [–2.09, 2.93]
Note. ND5 number of deletions or missing data; 95% CI5 95% confidence
interval.
Table 7 Study 5: Correlations Between Implicit and Explicit Measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. PU AV-IAT – .46** .24* 2.03 2.181 .09 2.08 2.07 2.04 2.11 2.09 2.03
2. PU Imp IAT – .27** 2.03 2.181 .10 2.05 2.13 2.01 .01 2.01 .02
3. Fr-Black IAT – .12 2.14 .171 .03 2.171 .07 .12 .06 .13
4. Ex Att Pow – 2.06 .73** .36** 2.49** .43** 2.05 2.13 .151
5. Ex Att Uni – 2.71** 2.12 .38** 2.21* .161 .171 2.02
6. Ex Att Pow-Uni – .33** 2.60** .44** 2.14 2.20* .12
7. Ex Imp Power – 2.66** .97** .05 .02 .06
8. Ex Imp Uni – 2.80** .07 .10 2.06
9. Ex Imp Pow-Uni – .01 2.01 .06
10. Ex Att French – .87** .19*
11. Ex Att Black-A – 2.29**
12. Ex Att Fr-B –
Note. PU AV-IAT5 power-universalism AV-IAT; PU Imp IAT5 importance power-universalism IAT; Fr-Black IAT5 implicit attitude toward French versus Black Afri-
can people; Ex Att Pow, Ex Att Uni, Ex Att Pow-Uni, Ex Att French, Ex Att Black-A, and Ex Att Fr-B5 explicit measures of attitude toward power, universalism,
French people, Black African people, power versus universalism, and French people versus Black African people; Ex Imp Power, Ex Imp Uni, and Ex Imp Pow-
Uni5 explicit importance attached to power, universalism, and power versus universalism. Ns vary between 86 and 123 due to missing data on the IATs.
1p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01.
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people. Turning to the implicit-explicit correlations, results
again suggested some independence between the implicit and
explicit measures of values: Both the implicit measurement of
attitudes to power versus universalism and the implicit impor-
tance attached to power versus universalism were at best weakly
associated with the corresponding explicit attitudes and impor-
tance judgments for the values.
A regression analysis revealed that the power-universalism
AV-IAT predicted spontaneous attitude to Black African people
(b5 .24, p< .01), whereas explicit power-universalism mea-
sures did not (bs .13, ps .29), overall R25 .10, F(3,
89)5 3.13, p5 .02. In addition, the power-universalism impor-
tance IAT continued to predict spontaneous attitude to Black
African people (b5 .26, p5 .009, ˛2p 5.07), whereas the
explicit power-universalism measures did not (bs .09,
ps .38), overall R25 .10, F(3, 95)5 3.29, p5 .02. Finally,
the power-universalism AV-IAT did not predict spontaneous
attitude to Black African people (b5 .20, p5 .10) after control-
ling for the explicit power-universalism measures and the
implicit power-universalism IAT (b5 .16, p5 .20). Thus, the
predictive ability of the values AV-IAT may be partly attribut-
able to shared variance with the values-importance IAT.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although research studies have frequently examined factors that
attenuate or augment value-attitude-behavior relations, studies
have not considered the role of spontaneous associations with
values. Across ﬁve studies and six samples, we predicted and
found that spontaneous favorability to two important values,
power and universalism, predicted greater spontaneous positivi-
ty to an ethnic in-group over ethnic out-groups (Studies 1, 2, 3,
and 5), and to men over women (Study 4). Moreover, spontane-
ous favorability to power over universalism values uniquely pre-
dicted gender bias in a refereeing decision task (Study 4).
Finally, spontaneous attitude to power versus universalism cor-
related strongly with the spontaneous importance ascribed to the
values, and both measures predicted an implicit measure of prej-
udice (Study 5).
Notwithstanding these consistent results, we should note that
each separate study was slightly underpowered to detect small-
to-medium effect sizes. Consequently, to probe the robustness
of the associations between the power-universalism AV-IAT
and the implicit measures of prejudice across the six samples,
we conducted a meta-analysis (N5 476). This analysis was con-
ducted in the program R, using formulas developed by Boren-
stein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2009) to test a random
effects model, wherein the true effect size may vary from study
to study (as the samples and target groups differed). (In all of
our analyses, the results did not differ if a ﬁxed effects model
was assumed instead of a random effects model.) The results
indicated a mean of r5 .26, 95% CI [.17, .34], Z5 5.56,
p< .0001, and heterogeneity of the true effect sizes was not
observed, Q[5]5 0.70, p5 .98. In contrast, the summary effect
for the achievement-benevolence AV-IAT was nonsigniﬁcant
across the three studies that included it, r5 .08, 95% CI [–.06,
.22], p5 .25. Furthermore, although the association between
explicit favorability to power (vs. universalism) and the implicit
measure of prejudice (Studies 1, 4, and 5; N5 365) was reliable,
95% CI [.02, .23], p5 .02, this was due to the large sample, as
the effect was weak, r5 .12, and less than half of the magnitude
of the effect for the AV-IAT. In fact, using Williams’s (1959) t-
test for depending correlations, which has been shown to do bet-
ter in terms of Type I and II error rates compared to similar tests
(May & Hittner, 1997), the power-universalism AV-IAT was
more strongly correlated with spontaneous prejudice compared
to both the achievement-benevolence AV-IAT, t(269)5 3.02,
p5 .001, and explicit favorability to power (vs. universalism),
t(289)5 2.14, p5 .02.4
To our knowledge, this research is the ﬁrst demonstration
that spontaneous value associations help to predict spontaneous
attitudes and behavior. Past research on values has used explicit
measures like the Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992),
but the present data show that an implicit measure of attitudes to
values or an implicit measure of importance (Study 5) may also
be useful when used alternatively or in combination. Measuring
spontaneous associations to values constitutes an easy way to
capture the affect that individuals attach to values without asking
them to introspect. It would be easy to expand this approach to
assess other values described in Schwartz’s (1992) model, and
this might help to predict diverse judgments and behaviors. For
example, spontaneous preferences between stimulation versus
security values may be uniquely related to spontaneous associa-
tions with alcohol, drugs, and calorie-rich food. This is an inter-
esting issue because Bar-Anan and Nosek (2014) found that
associations between different implicit measures regarding the
same attitude object depend on the attitude domain (e.g., race,
politics, and self-esteem). It is important to compare relations
between implicit measures of values and attitudes and behavior
in diverse domains.
Although the AV-IAT we developed provided consistent
support for the utility of measuring spontaneous associations
with values, it is important to recognize that the IAT is not the
only useful method for implicit measurement. Other implicit
measures take different but useful approaches. For example, the
personalized IAT looks at spontaneous associations personally
endorsed by participants, rather than being open to extrapersonal
associations, such as the inﬂuence of culture and media (Olson
& Fazio, 2004; see also Fiedler et al., 2006; Teige-Mocigemba
et al., 2010). Our reasoning was that the extrapersonal associa-
tions are important, even if not personally endorsed, because
they reﬂect the environment in which the values operate (see
also Nosek & Hansen, 2008). At the same time, however, the
personalized associations may play their own unique roles. This
and other implicit techniques merit future research. For instance,
another approach is to use single-category IATs (SC-IAT; Kar-
pinski & Steinman, 2006). SC-IATs can focus on one value set
at a time (e.g., power), which may help to detect whether one
end of a value dimension is particularly important in the
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obtained effects. As indicated in our introduction, the opposi-
tional motives postulated by Schwartz’s (1992) model provided
a theoretical basis for using the standard IAT, but the personal-
ized IAT and the SC-IATmay provide useful next steps.
It would also be interesting to compare these techniques with
other procedures that have been used in the personality literature
to examine individual differences in social motivation. It would
be particularly interesting to consider measures of the need for
power (see Winter et al., 1998; Schultheiss, 2008), which has
been examined using explicit and implicit techniques (McClel-
land et al., 1989). Values and needs may inﬂuence each other
(see Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), making it useful to examine their
interaction using implicit and explicit measures of both
constructs.
In sum, the thrust of our ﬁndings is that it is useful to expand
the assessment of values beyond the self-report measures
already employed. This expanded assessment will help to com-
plement the existing measures in a way that provides a broader
base for understanding values and their impacts. Our evidence
repeatedly shows that this approach can have predictive utility–
many associations between power and universalism values and
prejudice would have gone undetected using the explicit mea-
sures alone. The present ﬁndings help us better understand the
power-oriented behavior of the Napoleons and Machiavellis in
our world, but an expansion of this approach may help us under-
stand social behavior more generally.
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Notes
1. These include Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Como-
ros, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guin-
ea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania, Chad,
Togo, and Zimbabwe.
2. It has been suggested that participants be excluded from analyses
if they fail to classify at least eight items per page and made more
than 20% errors per page in paper-and-pencil IATs (e.g., Lane et al.,
2005). These criteria were consistently applied across our studies,
and the number of deletions, ranging from 2.73% to 37.8%, is con-
cordant with the number of deletions in Teachman and Brownell’s
(2001) use of the paper-and-pencil IAT (17.2% in mean across their
two IATs) and the number of deletions in Lemm, Lane, Sattler,
Khan, and Nosek’s (2008) use of the paper-and-pencil IAT (e.g.,
33% in study 2a with 8 items by page and 20% errors).
3. The table shows that power and universalism were not signiﬁcant-
ly related, which is congruent with Schwartz’s (1992) model and
ﬁndings. He explicitly suggests a motivational opposition between
power and universalism, but not an empirically negative relation in
each value rating taken separately. A negative relation is evident
only when correlating each value type with the other after centering
for mean ratings of all values, to control for individual differences in
value endorsement.
4. A regression analysis across Studies 1, 4, and 5, r25 .08, F(3,
278)5 7.75, p< .001, revealed that the implicit power-universalism
AV-IAT continued to predict implicit prejudice (b5 .24, p< .001)
after controlling for the impact of the separate explicit measures of
attitude toward power (b5 .01, p5 .77) and universalism (b5 –.08,
p5 .16) instead of their difference score. This result shows that the
superiority of the implicit measure did not arise because the use of
the difference score in the explicit power-universalism measure
masked asymmetric effects of these values.
References
Bar-Anan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2014). A comparative investigation
of seven implicit measures of social cognition. Behavior
Research Methods, 46, 668–688.
Blankenship, K. L., & Wegener, D. T. (2008). Opening the mind to
close it: Considering a message in light of important values
increases message processing and later resistance to change.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 196–213.
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H.
(2009). Introduction to meta-analysis. Chichester, UK: John
Wiley & Sons.
Chateignier, C., Dutrevis, M., Nugier, A., & Chekroun, P. (2009).
French-Arab students and verbal intellectual performance: Do
they really suffer from a negative intellectual stereotype? Europe-
an Journal of Psychology of Education, 2, 219–234.
Coulomb-Cabagno, G., Rascle, O., & Souchon, N. (2005). Players’
gender and male referees’ decisions about aggression in French
soccer: A preliminary study. Sex Roles, 52, 547–553.
Cronin, V. (1971). Napoleon. London: HarperCollins.
Dambrun, M., & Guimond, S. (2004). Implicit and explicit measures
of prejudices and stereotypes: Do they assess the same underlying
knowledge structure? European Journal of Social Psychology,
34, 663–676.
Dardenne, B., Delacolette, N., Gregoire, C., & Lecocq, D. (2006).
Latent structure of the French validation of the Ambivalent Sex-
ism Inventory: Eche`lle de Sexisme Ambivalent. L’Annee Psycho-
logique, 106, 235–264.
De Houwer, J., Baeyens, F., & Field, A. P. (2005). Associative learn-
ing of likes and dislikes: Some current controversies and possible
ways forward. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 161–174.
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit and
explicit prejudice and interracial interaction. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, 82, 62–68.
Implicitly Measuring Attitude to Values 671
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., Johnson, C., Johnson, B., & Howard,
A. (1997). On the nature of prejudice: Automatic and controlled
processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 510–
540.
Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psy-
chological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual pro-
cess model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,
75–93.
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cog-
nition research: Their meaning and use. Annual Review of Psy-
chology, 54, 297–327.
Feather, N. T. (2004). Value correlates of ambivalent attitudes
toward gender relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin, 30, 3–12.
Ferguson, M. J., & Porter, S. C. (2010). What is implicit about goal
pursuit? In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of
implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications
(pp. 311–331). New York: Guilford Press.
Fiedler, K., Messner, C., & Bluemke, M. (2006). Unresolved prob-
lems with the “I”, the “A”, and the “T”: A logical and psychomet-
ric critique of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). European
Review of Social Psychology, 17, 74–147.
Frank, M. G., & Gillovich, T. (1988). The dark side of self and
social perception: Black uniforms and aggression in profes-
sional sports. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
54, 74–85.
Frimer, J. A., Walker, L. J., Dunlop, W. L., Lee, B., & Riches, A.
(2012). Hierarchical integration of agency and communion: A
study of inﬂuential moral ﬁgures. Journal of Personality, 80,
1117–1145.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. (2006). Associative and proposi-
tional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit
and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692–
731.
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory:
Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 70, 491–512.
Graf, R. G., Yabko, B. A., & Christensen, P. (2009). Gender effects
in the assessment of technical fouls among high school collegiate
proxies. Journal of Sport Behavior, 32, 175–188.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Mea-
suring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit
Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74, 1364–1480.
Greenwald, A. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Attitudinal dissociation:
What does it mean? In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Bri~nol
(Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp.
65–82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Under-
standing and using the Implicit Association Test: I. An improved
scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
85, 197–216.
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M.
(2009). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test:
III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 97, 17–41.
Haddock, G., & Maio, G. R. (2015). Attitudes. In M. Hewstone, W.
Stroebe, & K. Jonas (Eds.), An introduction to social psychology
(6th ed., pp. 171–201). Wiley. ISBN: 978-1-118-82353-8.
Herek, G. M. (1986). The instrumentality of attitudes: Toward a neo-
functional theory. Journal of Social Issues, 42, 99–114.
Hofmann, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyens, F., &
Crombez, G. (2010). Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 390–421.
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H., & Schmitt,
M. (2005). A meta-analysis on the correlation between the
Implicit Association Test and explicit self-report measures. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1369–1385.
Karpinski, A., & Steinman, R. B. (2006). The single category Implic-
it Association Test as a measure of implicit social cognition.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 16–32.
Katz, D. (1960). The functional approach to the study of attitudes.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 24, 163–204.
Lane, K. A., Mitchell, J. P., & Banaji, M. (2005). Me and my group:
Cultural status can disrupt cognitive consistency. Social Cogni-
tion, 23, 353–383.
Lemm, K. M., Lane, K. A., Sattler, D. N., Khan, S. R., & Nosek, B.
A. (2008). Assessing implicit cognitions with a paper-format
implicit association test. In T. Morrison & M. Morrison (Eds.),
The psychology of modern prejudice (pp. 123–146). Hauppauge,
NY: Nova Science.
Machiavelli, N. (1981). The prince (G. Bull, Trans.). London: Pen-
guin. (Original work published 1513)
Maio, G. R. (2010). Mental representations of social values. Advan-
ces in Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 1–43.
Maio, G. R., & Olson, J. M. (1995). Relations between values, atti-
tudes, and behavioral intentions: The moderating role of attitude
function. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 266–
285.
Maio, G. R., & Olson, J. M. (1998). Values as truisms: Evidence and
implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,
294–311.
Maio, G. R., & Olson, J. M. (2000). What is a “value-expressive”
attitude? In G. R. Maio & J. M. Olson (Eds.), Why we evaluate:
Functions of attitudes (pp. 249–269). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Maio, G. R., Pakizeh, A., Cheung, W., & Rees, K. J. (2009). Chang-
ing, priming, and acting on values: Effects via motivational rela-
tions in a circular model. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 97, 699–715.
May, K., & Hittner, J. B. (1997). Tests for comparing dependent cor-
relations revisited: A Monte Carlo study. Journal of Experimental
Education, 65, 257–269.
McClelland, D. C., Koestner, R., & Weinberger, J. (1989). How do
self-attributed and implicit motives differ? Psychological Review,
96, 690–702.
Nosek, B. A., & Hansen, J. J. (2008). The association in our heads
belong to us: Searching for attitudes and knowledge in implicit
evaluation. Cognition and Emotion, 22, 553–594.
672 Souchon, Maio, Hanel, et al.
Nosek, B. A., Smyth, F. L., Hansen, J. J., Devos, T., Lindner, N. M.,
Ranganath, K. A., et al. (2007). Pervasiveness and correlates of
implicit attitudes and stereotypes. European Review of Social
Psychology, 18, 36–88.
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2001). Implicit attitude formation through
classical conditioning. Psychological Science, 12, 413–417.
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the inﬂuence of
extra-personal associations on the Implicit Association Test: Per-
sonalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo-
gy, 85, 653–667.
Pakizeh, A., Gebauer, J. E., & Maio, G. R. (2007). Basic human val-
ues: Inter-value structure in memory. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 43, 458–465.
Perugini, M., Richetin, J., & Zogmaister, C. (2010). Prediction of
behavior. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of
implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications
(pp. 255–277). New York: Guilford Press.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free
Press.
Rudman, L. A., & Goodwin, S. A. (2004). Gender differences in
automatic in-group bias: Why do women like women more than
men like men? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,
494–509.
Rudman, L. A., & Kilianski, S. E. (2000). Implicit and explicit atti-
tudes toward female authority. Personality and Social Psy-
chology Bulletin, 26, 1315–1328.
Schnabel, K., Asendorf, J. B., & Greenwald, A. G. (2008). Using
implicit association tests for the assessment of implicit personali-
ty self-concept. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews, & D. H. Saklofske
(Eds.), The Sage handbook of personality theory and assessment:
Vol. 2. Personality measurement and testing (pp. 508–528).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Schultheiss, O. C. (2008). Implicit motives. In O. P. John, R. W.
Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory
and research (3rd ed., pp. 603–633). New York: Guilford Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of
values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries.
In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol.25, pp. 1–65). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (1997). Inﬂuences of adaptation to com-
munist rule on value priorities in Eastern Europe. Political Psy-
chology, 18, 385–410.
Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., Harris, M.,
& Owens, V. (2001). Extending the cross-cultural validity of the
theory of basic human values with a different method of measure-
ment. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 519–542.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1997). Feelings and phenomenal expe-
riences. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psy-
chology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 433–465). New
York: Guilford Press.
Sekaquaptewa, D., Vargas, P., & Von Hippel, W. (2010). A practical
guide to paper-and-pencil implicit measures of attitudes.
In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit
social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications (pp.
140–155). New York: Guilford Press.
Sheldon, K. M., King, L. A., Houser-Marko, L., Osbaldiston, R., &
Gunz, A. (2007). Comparing IAT and TAT measures of power
versus intimacy motivation. European Journal of Personality,
21, 263–280.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup
theory of social hierarchy and oppression. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Skowronski, J. J., & Lawrence, M. A. (2001). A comparative study
of the implicit and explicit gender attitudes of children and col-
lege students. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 25, 155–165.
Slabbinck, H., De Houwer, J., &Van Kenhove, P. (2011). A pictorial
attitude IAT as a measure of implicit motives. European Journal
of Personality, 25, 76–86.
Souchon, N., Cabagno, G., Rascle, O., Traclet, A., Dosseville, F., &
Maio, G. R. (2009). Referees’ decision making about transgres-
sions: The inﬂuence of player gender at the highest national level.
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 33, 445–452.
Souchon, N., Livingstone, A., & Maio, G. R. (2013). The inﬂuence
of referees’ expertise, gender, motivation and time-constraints on
decisional bias against women. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology, 35, 585–599.
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reﬂective and impulsive determi-
nants of social behavior. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 8, 220–247.
Teachman, B. A., & Brownell, K. D. (2001). Implicit anti-fat bias
among health professionals: Is anyone immune? International
Journal of Obesity, 25, 1525–1531.
Teige-Mocigemba, S., Klauer, K. C., & Sherman, J. W. (2010). Prac-
tical guide to Implicit Association Task and related tasks. In B.
Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social
cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 117–139).
New York: Guilford Press.
Vargas, P. T., Sekaquaptewa, D., & Von Hippel, W. (2007). Armed
only with paper and pencil: “Low tech” measure of implicit atti-
tudes. In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit measures
of attitudes (pp. 103–124). New York: Guilford Press.
Williams, E. J. (1959). Signiﬁcance of difference between two nonin-
dependent correlation coefﬁcients. Biometrics, 15, 135–136.
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of
dual attitudes. Psychological Review, 107, 101–126.
Winter, D. G., John, O. P., Stewart, A. J., Klohnen, E. C., & Duncan,
L. E. (1998). Traits and motives: Toward an integration of two
traditions in personality research. Psychological Review, 105,
230–250.
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2001). Evaluative versus
conceptual judgements in automatic stereotyping and prejudice.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 244–252.
Implicitly Measuring Attitude to Values 673
Appendix A
Table 1A Summary of Implicit Categories and Stimuli Across the Studies
Stimuli to be classified
Target Pen and paper IATs 1 Items computer IATs
Flowers Daffodil Daisy Tulip
Insects Bugs Mosquito Roach
French Florent Ludovic Jero^me Sophie Julie
Arab Samir Rachid Karim
Black African S1 Mamadou Ousmane Cheikh Diama Coumba
Black African S5 Ibra Samba Adama
Men Pierre Paul Jacques
Women Marie Sophie Isabelle
Power Authority Social Power Wealth To command To manage
Universalism Equality Broad-mindedness Social Justice World at peace Tolerance
Achievement Ambitious Successful Influential Hard working Social recognition
Benevolence Forgiving Helpful Honest Sincerity Loyalty
Attribute Pen and paper IATs 1 Items computer IATs
Bad Terrible, Nasty, & Horrible Tragic, Agony, Humiliating, Unpleasant, Clumsy
Good Wonderful, Joyful, & Excellent Fantastic, Pleasure, Glorious, Superb, Extraordinary
Importance Important, Essential, & Fundamental
Unimportance Unimportant, Secondary, & Insignificant
Note. “S1” is for Study 1, and “S5” is for Study 5.
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